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 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 
 A. WAR POWERS OF THE BRITISH MONARCH 
  1. William Blackstone:  The king has absolute power over foreign 
    affairs and war (emphasis on royal prerogative) 
  2. John Locke (Early Whig View):  The "federative" or foreign 
    policy power belongs the executive but is limited by Parliament 
 B. DISTRIBUTION OF WAR POWERS IN THE AMERICAN    
  CONSTITUTION 
  1. War for Independence and Articles of Confederation 
   a. All executive powers of the British monarch passed to 
     the Continental Congress 
  2. Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia, 1787 
   a. The power of peace and war was entrusted to Congress 
   b. Supporters of a strong executive, like Charles Pinckney, 
     John Rutledge, and James Wilson opposed transferring  
    this power to the President 
   c. First Draft:  Congress was granted power to "make" war 
   d. Charles Pinckney objected because legislative 
     proceedings are too slow to respond to an emergency 
   e. James Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to substitute 
     the word "declare" for "make" so that the President 
     would have "the power to repel sudden attacks" 
   f. Separation of powers as a safeguard against arbitrary 
     rule:  "The purse and the sword must not be in the same  
    hands"  (George Mason) 
  3. Original Understanding:  A Summary 
   a. Congress granted ultimate authority to control the use of 
     military force  (Reading:  U.S. Const. Art. I, secs. 8-10) 
   b. President granted power to repel sudden attacks and 
     command of the armed forces  (Reading:  Art. II, sec. 2) 
   c. "Other than emergency actions to defend the country   
    while Congress is in recess, the power of Commander in 
     Chief exists to carry out legislative, not executive,   
    power"  (Louis Fisher) 
 
II. EVOLUTION OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 
 A. Early Applications 
  1. George Washington's Neutrality Proclamation (1793):  Hamilton 
    justified it as proper exercise of inherent executive power 
  2. Neutrality Act (1794) added congressional sanctions 
  3. John Adams:  Congress authorized but did not declare limited 
    war against France; the President sent naval forces to attack 
    French ships in retaliation for attacks on American ships 
  4. Thomas Jefferson:  Sent naval forces to fight an undeclared 
    war against the Barbary pirates and responded to British attack  
   on the Chesapeake after seeking congressional guidance 
  5. Summary:  The decision to go to war or deploy military forces 
    (as in an undeclared war) was reserved to Congress; the 
    President may repel attacks and respond to de facto wars 
 B. Extending the Scope of Presidential Prerogative 
  1. James Knox Polk and the Mexican War 
   a. Occupation of disputed territory on the Texas-Mexico 
     border provoked an incident and led the President to 
     seek and get a declaration of war from Congress, 1846 
   b. Retroactive censure of the President by the House, 1848 
  2. Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War 
   a. The President called up the state militia, supplied troops, 
     imposed martial law, imposed a blockade on Southern 
     states, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus before  
    calling Congress into special session 
   b. Retroactive approval by Congress (July 1861), which 
     delegated broad discretionary authority to the President 
  3. Customary Defensive War Power defined in Prize Cases (1863) 
  4. Gunboat Diplomacy:  Frequent presidential military 
    intervention in the Caribbean Basin following the Spanish-  
   American War and construction of the Panama Canal 
  5. Woodrow Wilson:  Occupied Haiti and the Dominican Republic; 
    intervened in Mexico, Russia; armed American merchantmen 
  6. John W. Burgess:  Restraints on foreign adventurism thwarted 
    by income tax and use of conscription 
  7. United Nations Charter and Mutual Defense Treaties 
 
IV. COLD WAR EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 
 A. Korean War  Harry Truman intervened on his own authority, did not 
   seek congressional authorization to commit American forces and, 
   apart from the retroactive sanction of the U.N. Security Council, acted  
  independently of the United Nations 
 B. Unilateral Presidential Actions:  U-2 Spy Planes, Lebanon, Bay of Pigs,  
  Cuba Missile Crisis, Congo, Dominican Republic, Southeast Asia 
 C. Vietnam War  Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 1964, subsequently treated 
   by Lyndon Johnson as a blank check for escalation; subsequent 
   congressional attempts to cut off funds were thwarted 
 
V. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 
 A. War Powers Resolution, 1973 
  1.  Background:  Senate's National Commitments Resolution, 1969 
  2. Recognizes that President has limited concurrent or initiating  
   power to use armed force, subject to subsequent (not prior)   
   congressional restraint 
  3. The reporting requirement of section 4(a)(1), which triggers a 
    sixty-day time limit, has not been consistently observed, e.g.,  
   El Salvador (1981), Lebanon (1982, resulting in a compromise  
   resolution in 1983), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989) 
 B. Boland Amendment, 1982:  Attached to a series of defense 
   appropriations laws, using the power of the purse to limit availability 
   of appropriated funds to the Contras 
 C. Overt/Covert Operations, e.g., Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua 
  D. Iran-Contra Hearings, 1987:  Majority report condemned the 
   operation's combination of the powers of the purse and the sword 
 E. Persian Gulf War:  George Bush secured the acquiescence of 
   Congress by acting under color of authority from U.N. Security 
   Council, although it did not require the use of force 
 F. Conclusion:  Congress and the President should seek to develop a 
  working consensus on war power issues for the post-Cold War era 
 
VI. A CASE STUDY 
 A. The Scenario 
  1. During congressionally-authorized hostilities against a foreign  
   state, a United States naval officer receives a presidential order  
   to seize American vessels or those suspected to be American  
   that were trading with the enemy.  The order is neither   
   authorized nor prohibited by Congress.  In fact, the law is silent  
   about the President's authority to issue the order.  The officer  
   carries out this order but is then sued by the owner of a vessel  
   that has been seized. 
  2. Premise of the Suit:  The President's order is illegal since it has 
    not been authorized by Congress. 
 B. Key Legal Issue:  Is the officer personally liable for damages? 
 C. Key Political Issue:  Does the President of the United States have war 
   powers that may be exercised independently of, and perhaps contrary 
   to, the war powers of Congress? 
 D. Maxims 
  1. The laws are silent amidst the clash of arms.  --  Cicero 
   2. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon  
   their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.  --    
   Robert Jackson, Steel Seizure Case, 1952 (concurring opinion) 
 E. Discussion of Handout on Little v. Barreme (1804) 
 
VII.  READING:  AN OUTLINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
 A. CONGRESSIONAL WAR POWER 
  1. Congress has the power to "provide for the common Defence" 
  2. Congress has the power to "declare War" 
  3. Congressional power also extends to the following: 
   a. Piracy, e.g., by the Barbary states of North Africa 
   b. Felonies committed on the high seas, e.g., the    
    murder of Leon Klinghoffer by terrorists 
   c.  Offenses against the law of nations 
   d.  Letters of marque and reprisal (including power to initiate 
     hostilities without declaring war) 
   e.  Captures, e.g., the Amistad Case (1839) 
   f. Raising and supporting armies 
   g.  Biennial appropriations 
   h.  Providing and maintaining a Navy 
   i.  Making rules for the government and regulation of land  
    and naval forces, such as General Order No. 100 during  
    the Civil War 
   j. Calling forth and governing the militia when in the   
    national service 
  4. General Provisions 
   a. Necessary and Proper Clause 
   b. Appropriations Clause 
 B. PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 
  1. Specific Provisions 
   a. President is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
   b. President is Commander in Chief of state militias when 
     called (by Congress) into the service of the United States 
  2. General Provisions 
   a. Treaty Making Power 
 
 
Cox, Henry Bartholomew. War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: 1829-1901. 
 Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984. 
 
Glennon, Michael J. Constitutional Diplomacy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UNiversity 
 Press, 1990. 
 
Stern, Gary M., and Morton H. Halperin, ed. The U.S. Constitution and the Power 
 to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
 Press, 1994. 
 
Thomas, Ann Van Wynen, and A. J. Thomas, Jr. The War-Making Powers of the 
 President: Constitutional and International Law Aspects. Dallas: SMU Press, 
 1982. 
